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The objective vis-d-vis Political Union should be to
demonstrate more visibly that WEU is an integral part of the
European integration process. The objective vis-d-vis the [NATO]
Alliance should be to achieve a strong, new transatlantic partnership
by strengthening the European component, contributing to the
[NATO] Alliance's evolution...I
I. INTRODUCTION
The act of defending one's state or region is generally seen as
an "inherent and autonomous right" legitimated in international law
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.2 The concept of
international self-defense, as a right to protect one's territory against
an armed attack attempted by another state, initially developed from
two independent sources: first, Hugo Grotius' natural law doctrine of
self-defense, states that preservation of the self [is to be] regarded as
a natural right of the state ".... that could not be abrogated or limited
by positive law;"3 and second, positive law is of minor importance to
power, which means that: "self-defense could not be governed by law
1 EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: PARIS, 22
FEBRUARY 1991, reprinted in THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE WESTERN
EUROPEAN UNION (WEU): INTRODUCTION AND BASIC DOCUMENTS, at 106 (Arie
Bloed & Ramses A. Wessel eds., 1994) [hereinafter CHANGING FUNCTIONS].
2 Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
259, 259 (1989); United Nations Charter art. 51 [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER]
("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual...
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations..
."1).
3 Schachter, supra note 2, at 259. (Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reflects
Grotius' natural law doctrine by characterizing self-defense as an "inherent right");
see HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. II, ch. I, pt. III, at 172 (Carnegie
Endowment trans. 1925) (1646) ("the right of self-defense ... has its origin
directly, and chiefly, in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection.").
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when a grave threat to the power of a state [or region] or to its way of
life was perceived by that state [or region]."4 Even though self-
defense is now governed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
international lawyers and legal scholars still subscribe to the concept
of self-defense "as an autonomous, nonderogable right that 'exists'
independently of legal rules."' Thus, under international law, states
and regions consider self-defense to be the "only ground for the
unilateral use of force."6 Then, once a state or region makes a
decision to defend itself, this decision exerts great leverage over that
particular state or region's "law-shaping" procedures, "influencing
expectations as to the acceptability of future actions [advocating] use
of force."7
Common defense plans had been discussed since the inception
of the idea to unite Western Europe. Nonetheless, Western Europe's
quest to find a legal framework for managing its security issues has
been difficult and drawn-out. The European Economic Community
4 Shachter, supra note 2, at 260; see Dean Acheson, Remarks, 57 ASIL
PROC. 13, 14 (1963) (Law "simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate
power . . . The survival of states is not a matter of law."); cf. HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE FuNcTION OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
180 (1933) ("Such a claim is self-contradictory inasmuch as it purports to be based
on legal right and at the same time, it dissociates itself from regulation and
evaluation of the law.").
5 Schachter, supra note 2, at 260.
6 Id. at 265 (This definition of self-defense is realistic since first, legal
prohibitions against use of force, like those found in the U.N. Charter or other
collective security alliances, have not eradicated international aggression; and
second, the right of collective self-defense recognizes that the victims of an attack
may need military aid from other states.).
7 Id. at 266.
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("EEC"), established by the TREATY OF ROME on March 25, 1957,8
had been intentionally created and strictly maintained as an economic
association among member nations. However, the TREATY OF ROME
does permit an individual member state to take necessary measures
to protect its security interests,9 to "adopt necessary measures in the
event of substantial internal disturbances, of serious international
tension or in the event of war,"' 0 and to have access to the European
Court of Justice." All these provisions permit members to remain as
sovereign nations. By the beginning of the 1980's, the EEC began to
discuss the advantages of community-wide political cooperation.
These discussions resulted in the signing of the Single European
Act,' 2 giving the EEC a legal basis for political cooperation.
European Political Cooperation, codified in Article 30 of SEA,
permits member states to "jointly formulate and implement a
8 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME].
9 Article 223(1) provides:
(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information
the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential
elements of its security;
(b) Any Member State may take the measure it considers
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its
security, and which are connected with the production of or trade
in arms, ammunitions and war materials; such measures shall
not, however, prejudice the conditions of competition in the
common market in respect of products not intended for
specifically military purposes. Id.
10 Heinrich Kirschner, Symposium on US.-E.C. Legal Relations: The
Framework ofthe European Union Under the Treaty ofMaastricht, 13 J.L. & COM.
233, 241(1994); see TREATY OF ROME, supra note 8, at art. 224.
11 See id. at art. 225.
12 Single European Act, June 29, 1987, O.J. (L 169/1) (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
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European foreign policy,"' 3 by "consult[ing] each other, develop[ing]
common objectives, determin[ing] common positions, refrain[ing]
from impeding the formation of a consensus and refrain[ing] from
impeding the joint action this could produce."' 4 Furthermore, the
SEA foresaw cooperation on security matters by providing, in Article
30(6)(a), that the EEC's member states are "ready to coordinate their
positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of
security."' 5 According to Article 30, achieving "closer cooperation
in the field of security . . . [would mean working] within the
framework of [either] the WEU or the [NATO] Alliance [as
hereinafter defined]."' 6 This article will discuss the creation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and its role in the
defense of the North Atlantic region, especially that of its member
states in western, and now central, Europe. 7 Next, the article
13 Id. at art. 30.
14 Kirschner, supra note 10, at 241.
15 SEA, supra note 12, at art. 30(6)(a); see G. Porter Elliot, Neutrality, the
Acquis Communautaire and the European Union's Search for a Common Foreign
and Security Policy under Title V of the Maastricht Treaty: The Accession of
Austria, Finland and Sweden, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601, 614 n.58 (1996)
(construing Jonathan Faull, Lecture at the Brussels Seminar on Law and
Institutions of the European Community, Institut d'ttudes Europ6ennes (July 5,
1994)). Several polls have been taken to see the percentage of Europeans favoring
a common security policy. In 1987, less than half of the EEC favored a common
security policy. By 1989, 36% of those polled wanted a common security policy,
whereas 30% spoke out against the idea. After the Gulf War, in 1990, 61% of the
EEC citizens polled favored a common security plan while 29% voiced opposition.
"By 1993, 77% believed the EEC should pursue a common security policy,
compared to only 13% opposed to the idea."
16 SEA, supra note 12, at art. 30(6)(c).
17 As of 1999, Poland and Hungary became the first of the former Soviet-
bloc nations to gain admittance into NATO.
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discusses the formation of the Western European Union ("WEU") as
the European Union's ("EU") common foreign and security pillar.
Finally, the article compares and contrasts the similarities and
differences between NATO and the WEU, discussing each
organization's function in protecting Europe's borders from outside
invasion.
II. THE CREATION OF THE NATO ALLIANCE
The idea of creating a military alliance to defend Western
Europe against the impending threat of an invasion by the Soviet
Union grew out of the wreckage of World War II, after the Soviets
began to annex Eastern and parts of Central Europe into its sphere of
power by use of force. Besides fearing a communist invasion,
Western Europe still felt threatened by the memory of a rearmed
Germany."8 Against this setting of increasing insecurity, the United
Kingdom and France signed the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual
Assistance on March 4, 1947"9 in Dunkirk, France, in which the
parties assented to cooperate militarily with each other in the event
Germany "disregard[ed] the restrictions placed upon it after [World
War II],"2° and attacked either party.
By the late 1940's, the United States began urging Western
Europe to unite and thereby remedy its post-war economic and
military weaknesses. After signing the Treaty of Dunkirk, British
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin initiated the enlargement of the scope
18 See Elliot, supra note 15, at 613 ("Germany has the capacity to do
great harm in Europe and an historic propensity to do so.").
19 TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, Mar. 4, 1947, 9
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Treaty of Dunkirk].
20 3 History of the WEU: 3.1 Origins 2 (visited Dec. 21, 1996)
<http://www.helsinki.fi/valttdk/hayrinen/weu.html>.
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of European military cooperation by signing the Treaty of Brussels.2'
The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries22 first
negotiated the Brussels Pact,23 the precursor to both NATO and
WEU, to defend themselves against "an armed attack in Europe."24
However, the Brussels Pact, unlike the Treaty of Dunkirk, aimed to
defend against the Soviet Union, as well as Germany. 5
The Brussels Pact, compatible with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter,26 had been primarily conceived as a military alliance,
although its complete title also included the words "Collaboration in
Economic, Social and Cultural Matters." '27 The purpose of the
Brussels Pact, as written in Article 1, had been to uphold the
principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the
constitutional traditions and the rule of law" within its member
states. 8 Under Article 5, the Brussels Pact authorized automatic
21 TREATY OF BRUSSELS, Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter the
BRUSSELS PACT].
22 The Benelux countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
23 BRUSSELS PACT, supra note 21.
24 MARINA SALVIN, 451 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION: THE NORTH
ATLANTIC PACT 393 (1949) (quoting BRUSSELS PACT, supra note 7, at art. 4); see
id. (President Truman, addressing Congress after the signing of the BRUSSELS PACT
on Mar. 17, 1948, said, "the determination of the free countries of Europe to
protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help
them do so.").
25 BRUSSELS PACT, supra note 21, at preamble (the preamble pledges "to
take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of
a policy of aggression").
26 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 2, at art. 51.
27 SALVIN, supra note 24, at 393.
28 BRUSSELS PACT, supra note 21, at 153.
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military and other assistance against an armed attack by any source
whatsoever.29 Additionally, the Brussels Pact provided its members
with a forum to discuss far-reaching defense issues constituting "a
threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise."30
On September 28, 1948, the ministers of defense and the
chiefs of staff of the five BRUSSELS PACT nations formed a joint
military organization for common defense called Uniforce, under the
control of Britain's Field Marshall Montgomery, with headquarters
in Fontainbleau, France. Then, on April 8, 1949, these defense
ministers and chiefs of staff, under full authority from their respective
governments, agreed upon a plan to deflect Soviet military
aggression.3 Both the United States and Canada were in attendance
of the consummation of this plan, but only as observers. However,
Uniforce only existed on paper since post-war Europe had little
manpower or armaments. "After evaluating their available resources,
the BRUSSELS PACT nations, plus Denmark, Norway and Italy, found
it necessary to turn to the United States for assistance"32 due to the
fact that Uniforce had huge gaps in both manpower and matiriel
which only a military alliance with the United States could fill. In
addition, Western Europe needed manpower to create a defensive
military machine capable of stopping a Soviet invasion while
providing psychological security. In essence, Western Europe saw
the placement of American nuclear and conventional forces in its
territory as vital to its security.
29 Id. art. 4 (if any Member State became the recipient of an armed attack,
the parties would, "in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance
in their power").
30 Salvin, supra note 24, at 393.
31 Id. at 394 (Uniforce charted lines of defense, calculated each country's
contribution to the army and airforce, and coordinated arms production).
32 Id. at 395.
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Meanwhile, the United States Senate was keenly interested in
the BRUSSELS PACT and passed the VANDENBERG RESOLUTION on
June 11, 1948.3' The Resolution contained a three-part plan designed
to both advise President Harry S. Truman and facilitate his
participation in working toward international peace under the
auspices of the United Nations. The plan provided first, for the
"progressive development of regional and other collective
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance
with... the [U.N.] Charter;"34 second, that the United States should,
by constitutional processes, associate with other regional alliances
"based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, [which
could] affect its national security;"3 and third, that the United States
should try to maintain the peace "by making clear its determination
to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under
Article 51 [of the U.N. Charter] should any armed attack occur
affecting its national security." '3 6 By passing the Resolution, the
United States determined that an integrated defense alliance
protecting the North American region had become "desirable and
necessary."37 By December, 1948, the United States, Canada, and the
BRUSSELS PACT nations began negotiating an integrated regional
defense alliance which would subsequently become NATO.
As a result of the negotiations, the foreign ministers of twelve
nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949 in




36 SALVIN, supra note 24, at 396 (quoting the Resolution, supra note 33).
37 Id
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Washington, D.C.3" Then in 1951, all military responsibilities
exercised by the BRUSSELS PACT transferred over to the NATO
alliance.39 The NATO Treaty, establishing NATO as a military
alliance for collective defense, is legally anchored in Art. 51 of the
U.N. Charter.4" As set out in the Treaty, NATO's role is to maintain
security, peace and freedom by creating a peacetime alliance for
mutual self-defense against armed attacks in either Western Europe
or North America. NATO, according to the NATO Treaty's
preamble, had been specifically designed to deter aggression by first,
"safeguard[ing] the freedom, common heritage and civilization' 1 of
the populace; and second, "unit[ing] [the parties'] efforts for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security."42
Therefore, in order for NATO to effectively provide collective
defense for its signatories, all member states must agree that an armed
attack against one or more parties is an attack against them all.43
38 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter NATO Treaty] (The twelve original signatories are Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in
1952, the Federal Republic of Germanyjoined in 1955, and Spain joined in 1982.).
39 See The European Security and Defence Identity: March 1996: The
Western European Union 2 (visited Jan. 11, 1997)
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs3.htm>.
40 Shashi Tharoor, The Changing Face of Peace-keeping and Peace
Enforcement, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 408 (1995).
41 SALVIN, supra note 24, at 403 (quoting NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at
preamble).
42 Id.
43 Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty provides:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an
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The NATO alliance is not a supranational organization;"
rather, it is based on voluntary military cooperation among
independent sovereign nations. NATO has no independent policy-
making capacity and can only act by the unanimous consent of all its
member states, even though each member state's delegates only
represent their own state's particular point of view. Conversely, this
allows each member state to know the positions of its allies. If
common ground cannot be reached on a decision facing the member
states, those members who cannot agree are free to pursue individual
courses of action. In such cases, NATO's solidarity is not necessarily
threatened because members are encouraged to consult with one
another to guarantee both permanent dialogue and mutual
understanding of their respective national policies. Thus, major
policy differences between member states can be settled to protect
NATO's "common security interests and [to] preserve [its] political
solidarity."45
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of
the [U.N. Charter], will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.
NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at art. 5.
44 Id.




III. THE NATO TREATY
The NATO Treaty contains fourteen provisions, designed to
"promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."46
Article 1 of the NATO Treaty declares NATO's fidelity to the U.N.
Charter by settling any international disturbances according to its
dictates, and "refrain[ing] in [its] international relations from the
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations."47 Next, Article 2 recognizes that parties must
actively pursue peace, even when there is no war, "by strengthening
their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding"48 and
by "encourag[ing] economic collaboration"49 between member and
nonmember states.
The core of the Treaty, Articles 3, 4, and 5, addresses mutual
aid among member states.50 Article 3, which applies during
peacetime to alert NATO's defense forces to the possibility of an
armed attack, provides that "parties, separately and jointly, by means
of ... self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their
46 NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at preamble.
47 Id. at art. 1.
48 Id. at art. 2.
49 Id.
50 See SALVIN, supra note 24, at 404 (mutual aid is defined as each party's
contribution of such aid "as it reasonably can, consistent with due regard to the
requirements of economic health" (quoting Report of the Secretary of State to the
President, Apr. 7, 1949, Dep't of State, Bulletin 532 (Apr. 24, 1949))); see also
Vaughn A. Carney, On the Elimination of the NATO Entitlement, 13 J. INT'L L.
Bus. 487 (NATO commitments cost the United States almost half of its defense
budget, or $160 billion per year, whereas Great Britain, France and Germany each
spend approximately $28 billion per year on defense.).
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individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."'5 If an
aggressor, whether or not a member state, threatens a member state
but stops short of an armed attack, Article 4 provides for consultation
among the aggressor and member states when "the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened. 52 Article 5 comes into play if an armed attack occurs,
even though it does not guarantee armed protection in the event that
a member state is attacked. Each member state individually decides
how to assist the attacked party "by taking forthwith, individually and
in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including use of armed force."53 NATO also responds, under Article
6, to "armed attacks, [as defined in Article 5 ] on the territory of any
of the Parties in Europe or North America... or on the vessels or
aircraft in this area of any of the parties. 54
"Sovereign equality and individual decision"" are also at the
center of NATO's representation and membership provisions. Article
9, which "establish[es] a council, on which each of [the members]
shall be represented to consider matters concerning the
implementation of this Treaty,"56 structures NATO as "an integrated
military command organization and a mechanism for collective
decision-making." '57 Also, under Article 10, "[t]he parties may, by
51 NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at art. 3.
52 Id. at art. 4.
53 Id. at art. 5.
54 Id. at art. 6.
55 SALvIN, supra note 24, at 402.
56 NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at art. 9; Hon. John P. Flaherty & Maureen
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unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position
to [both] further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.""8 The
Treaty then protects member states from any unwanted additions by
requiring that each new member be unanimously voted into NATO.
In sum, NATO is designed to maintain the peace and security
of the North Atlantic region, and Europe in particular, by protecting
it from armed attacks and revolutions. Therefore, by the terms of its
provisions, the NATO Treaty represents "an advance intent [by
member states] to resist military attack."59 To be able to deter
aggression, member states, who had demobilized their armies and
reduced operations of other military-related organizations after World
War II, needed to be rearmed.6" Therefore, in order to preserve peace
and stability in the North Atlantic area, NATO, and the United States
in particular, rearmed and reindustrialized member states whose
territories and economies had been extensively damaged by the
Germans in World War II. In this way, NATO, the key element of
European defense since its formation, has grown into a powerful and
technologically advanced defensive military alliance.6'
58 NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at art. 10.
59 SALVIN, supra note 24, at 416.
60 See Origins of the Alliance (visited Jan. 11, 1997)
<http://www.nato.int/welcome/int-p 1 5.htm> (after World War II, the Soviet Union
maintained its armed forces at full strength, breaching its duty to demobilize under
the U.N. Charter).
61 See 1994 Summit of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
1994 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH (Dec. 12, 1994) (While in Budapest, Hungary in
1994, President Bill Clinton stated, "NATO remains the bedrock of security in
Europe.").
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IV. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WEU As THE DEFENSIVE
COMPONENT OF THE EU
During this time, in May, 1948, Western Europe began
economically integrating itself into the EEC at the Congress of
Europe held in The Hague, Netherlands.62 In the area of security,
Western European nations thought that despite NATO's benefits, it
did not contribute to the nascent idea of European solidarity. So, in
1952, France initiated an integrated Western European defense
alliance with the member states of the European Coal and Steel
Community and the United Kingdom called the European Defence
Community ("EDC"). By May 1953, the EDC Treaty had been
signed in Paris, even though it had been universally reproached for
"lack[ing] democratic safeguards. 63 In late 1952, a second treaty, the
European Political Community Treaty ("EPC") had been created by
the ministers of ECSC nations. The merger of the parties' armed
forces never took place due to the United Kingdom's lack of
commitment and France's unwillingness to give up command over its
military.' 4 The EDC and EPC's failure to produce an integrated
security alliance among its members led to the formation of an
62 CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xiv. For the three treaties leading
to the Treaty of Paris and the creation of the EEC, see Treaty Instituting the
Benelux Union, Feb. 3, 1958, 381 U.N.T.S. 260; Treaty Establishing the Coal &
Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafterECSC]; and Treaty
Establishing the Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167
[hereinafter Eurotom].
63 Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 56, at 933.
64 History of the WEU, supra note 20, at 5; CHANGING FUNCTIONs, supra
note 1, at xiv; see Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 56, at 933 (parties to the
EPC argued that without the United Kingdom as a member, "the EPC would allow
a rearmed Germany to be free of political control").
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alternative alliance. In response to the failure of both the EDC and
the EPC, British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden assembled a
conference in London from September28 to October 30, 1954 among
Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany ("FRD"), France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States; this conference resulted in large scale revisions to the
Brussels Pact.66 The conference produced the Paris Agreements,67
signed on October 23, 1954, which modified the Brussels Pact by
establishing the WEU, with Italy and, most notably, the FRD joining
as members.
V. THE WEU TREATY
Besides creating a defensive military alliance comprised only
of European nations, the WEU Treaty initially provided for close
economic, social and cultural cooperation among its members.68
According to Article 1, the parties "will so organise and co-ordinate
their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, 69
65 Both the EDC and EPC treaties failed when tensions loosened after the
death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War. See Id.
66 See CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xiv (Brussels Pact nations
invited both Italy and the FRD to become parties to the treaty at this conference,
setting the stage for the FRD's postwar re-emergence as a participant in Western
Europe's continuing integration).
67 Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective
Self-Defence, Oct. 23, 1954,211 U.N.T.S. 342 [hereinafter WEU Treaty] (signed
by Belgium, France, FRD, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom).
68 See CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xv (as stated in the preamble,
the WEU Treaty's stated purpose had been "to promote unity and to encourage the
integration of Europe").
69 WEU Treaty, supra note 67, at art. I
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while providing that this cooperation "shall not involve any
duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic
organisations in which the [parties] are or may be represented. 70
However, because of Western Europe's growing participation in the
EEC and its wider, more extensive scope of economic activities, the
WEU, in 1970, had to abandon its role in the economic, social and
cultural integration of Europe to concentrate solely on European
defense.7'
The WEU protects its members against attacks from nations
outside the alliance, as well as securing internal stability through its
parties' commitment to form a cohesive Western European defensive
organization. Regardless of the source of attack, Article V of the
WEU Treaty, provides:
If any of the... Parties should be the object of an
armed attack in Europe, the other... Parties will, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so
attacked all the military and other aid and assistance
in their power.72
In comparison with NATO, which is authorized to take whatever
action it deems necessary in the event of an armed attack, "the WEU
commitment to assist the party that is the object of an armed attack is
[both] automatic and obligatory."'73
70 Id.
71 The WEU officially ended its economic, social and cultural activities
when the United Kingdom began membership negotiations with the EEC in 1970.
See CHANGING FUNCTIONs, supra note 1, at xv.
72 WEU Treaty, supra note 67, at art. V.
73 3 History of the WEU, 3.2 Establishment 3 (visited Dec. 21, 1996)
<http://www.helsinki.fi/valttdk/hayrinen/weu.html>.
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Additionally, under Article VII of the WEU Treaty, parties are
forbidden to take part in any defensive military alliance directed
against any other member of the WEU.74 Article VIII provides
parties with a forum for consultation by requesting that "the Council
... be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with
regard to any situation which may arise."75 This means that the mere
presence of a situation possibly causing a threat to the peace may
result in consultations, if any party so requests. Also, Article VIII
protects beyond the boundaries of its member states since
consultations could take place on actions "out of [the WEU's
geographical] area."76 Next, Article VIII provides that "[t]he Council
shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting
procedure has been or may be agreed."" Article X stresses the
importance of peacefully settling disputes with nations inside and
outside the alliance,7" and discusses the International Court of
Justice's role in resolving disputes.79 In Article XII, members may
74 WEU Treaty, supra note 67, at art. VII ("None of the High Contracting
Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against
any other of the High Contracting Parties.").
75 WEU Treaty, supra note 67, at art. VII (The main organ of the WEU, the
Council, "consider[s] matters concerning the execution of [the WEU] Treaty, its
Protocols and their Annexes.").
76 Id. at art. VIII ("the Council shall be convened ... to consult.., in
whatever area this threat should arise"); see CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1,
at xvi.
77 WEU Treaty, supra note 67, at art. VIII.
78 Id. at art. X (parties must endeavor "to settle disputes only by peaceful
means").
79 Id. ("The High Contracting Parties will... settle all disputes falling within
the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, by referring them to the Court," however, "the High Contracting Parties
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cease being a party to the WEU only after fifty years of membership,
whereas the NATO alliance may last indefinitely.80 Lastly, the WEU
Treaty is then completed by four implementing protocols and their
respective annexes.81
VI. REACTIVATING THE WEU UNDER THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
For the next thirty years the WEU did not have the
opportunity to fully develop into a defensive organization due to
NATO's superior ability in managing Western Europe's security
issues. Nevertheless, the WEU did play two minor roles; it helped
solve a French/German territory dispute over the Saar region by
giving it back to the FRD, and when French president Charles
DeGaulle opposed the United Kingdom's attempt to join the EEC
because of its close alliance with the United States, the WEU served
as the sole consultative forum, serving the EEC and the United
will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph
2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.").
80 Because the WEU Treaty simply modified the Brussels Pact, signed in
1948, the first possible opportunity to denounce the WEU would be in 1998.
However, if the WEU Treaty, signed in 1954, is seen as creating a separate
organization, parties could not denounce their membership until 2004. To
denounce membership in the WEU, a party must give notice to the Belgian
government one year in advance. See id. at xvii; SALVIN, supra note 24, at 402;
Jane's Defence Weekly: Interview with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the
Assembly of the WEU 10 (visited Jan. 11, 1997)
<http://www.thomson.com/janes/960327.html> (the Brussels Pact of 1948, valid
for fifty years, means the WEU could be renewed or disbanded in 1998).
81 See Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty (Oct. 23,
1954); Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union (Oct. 23, 1954);
Protocol No. III on the Control of Armaments (Oct. 23, 1954); and Protocol No.
IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments (Oct.
23, 1954), reprinted in CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at 1-3 8.
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Kingdom. However, from 1973 until its rehabilitation in the 1980's,
the WEU entered its "somnolent years" 2 and ceased functioning.
Then in February, 1984, French foreign minister Claude
Cheysson, at French President Frangois Mitterand's suggestion,
distributed a memorandum recommending that the WEU be
reactivated. In response, two meetings took place with the hope of
reviving the WEU as a strong European arm of NATO.83 The first
meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council in eleven years convened,
in Paris, France on June 12, 1984, and subsequently voted to
reanimate the WEU 4 Then, at the second meeting in Rome, Italy
from October 26 to 27, 1984, the Council formally reactivated the
WEU in the Rome Declaration seeking "to make better use of the
WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between Member
82 3 Origins: 3.4 The Quiet Years: 1955-1984 13 (visited Dec. 21, 1996)
<http:llwww.helsinki.f/valttdk/hayrinen/weu.html>; see id. at 14 (Between 1973
and its reactivation, no ministerial meetings took place. Between 1974 and 1977,
German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel stated that all WEU meetings should be
canceled altogether.).
83 See 3 Origins: 3.5 The Reactivation 4 (visited Dec. 21, 1996)
<http://www. helsinki.filvalttdk/hayrinen/weu.html>; see also id. at 1, 2, 3.
84 The Council, the main governing body of the WEU, is based on Article
VIII of the WEU Treaty. The Councils job is "to consider matters concerning the
execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes." The Council's
decisions are made by unanimous vote, and, while the WEU Treaty is legally
binding under international law, "the decisions of the Council are binding in a
political sense only." See CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xix-xx.
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States in the field of security policy to encourage consensus."8 5
Under Article 8 of the Rome Declaration, members are encouraged
to coordinate their views on "the specific conditions of security in
Europe," particularly on matters of "defence, arms control and
disarmament." 6 Article 8 also allows members to "also consider the
implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. 87
The first meeting of the reactivated WEU took place in Bonn,
FRD on April 22 to 23, 1985, where members in the Bonn
Communiqu6 reaffirmed their commitment to the proposals set out
in the Rome Declaration. 8 Then in 1986, the EEC signed the SEA,
affirming a legal basis for integrated political cooperation.
Thereafter, on October 26 to 27, 1987, defense ministers from the
WEU member states convened in The Hague, Netherlands, to adopt
the "Platform on European Security Interests," 9 declaring the WEU
as the provider of a strong European "defense identity."
90
85 Id. at xix; see CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xviii (The WEU had
been reactivated for three reasons: first, in 1981, France and the FRD, by
establishing the failed Genscher-Colombo initiative "to place security and defence
issues under the umbrella of the EPC to strengthen the European pillar of NATO,"
necessarily put the WEU back on their agendas, since the FRD wished to change
those provisions of the WEU Treaty which discriminated against its armaments
industry; second, Europe began to reconsider the NATO alliance after the United
States first planned, in 1979, to deploy American missiles in Europe, thereafter
attempting to deploy a nuclear missile system in outer space called the Strategic
Defense Initiative or "Star Wars" over the European landmass; and third, Europe
needed a separate defensive alliance to "achieve a true security political
dimension.").
86 3 Origins: 3.5 The Reactivation, supra note 82, at 6.
87 Id.
88 See id. at 8.
89 Id. at 17.
90 Id.
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The SEA had envisioned future security cooperation within
the EEC, "[invoking] the cooperation of each Member State in
handling security issues required a legal foundation."'" After months
of apprehension, the EEC signed the Treaty on European Union in
Maastricht on February 7, 1992, thereby establishing the European
Union ("EU").92 The EU is not a new legal entity; rather, "[it] is
founded on three existing communities which remain legal entities in
their own right and continue to fulfill their different
responsibilities."93  The Maastricht Treaty is composed of three
separate, but linked communities or pillars: the first pillar providing
for an economic and monetary union, the second pillar outlining a
common foreign and security policy, and the third pillar detailing
cooperation in the areas of justice and home affairs.
Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regulates and gives legal
effect to the second pillar by providing that a "common foreign and
security policy is hereby established."94 In creating the second pillar,
the EU's primary purpose had been" to assert its identity on the
international scene, in particular through the implementation of a
common foreign and defence policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence."95 Under the wording of this provision, it is
understood that the EU's common foreign and security policy does
not yet incorporate defense issues. Procedurally, the common foreign
91 Elliot, supra note 15, at 614.
92 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992 O.J. © 224) 1 (1992), [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty] (the Maastricht Treaty went
into force on November 1, 1993); see id. at tit. 1, art. A ("[b]y this Treaty, the High
Contracting Parties establish themselves a European Union").
93 Kirschner, supra note 10, at 242.
94 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.
95 Id. at art. B.
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and security policy is to be debated in the Council,96 the Commission
is to perform any associated work,97 while the European Parliament
may question, consult and make suggestions to the Council.98 Under
Article C, both the Commission and the Council are also jointly
responsible for "ensuring the consistency of all foreign policy
measures taken by the [EU] in the context of its... security...
policy."99 However, the European Court of Justice has not been given
jurisdiction over the EU's second pillar.'00 Article J. 1, under Title V,
sets out the objectives of the common foreign and security policy:
96 Id. at art. J.8.
97 Id. at art. J.9.
98 Id. at art. J.7.
99 Dr. Hans-Joachim Glaesner, Formulation of Objectives and Decision-
Making Procedure in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 765, 766
(1995); see Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. C. "The Union shall in
particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context
of its ... security ... polic[y]. The Council and the Commission shall be
responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation
of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers." See also
Kirschner, supra note 10, at 243 ("Article 228a" of the Treaty of Rome, as
amended by the Maastricht Treaty, "is designed to guarantee consistency between
the common positions or joint actions adopted in the field of the common foreign
or security policy and the measures of the EC concerning economic relations with
third countries.").
100 The EU cannot make its decisions binding with regards to the second
pillar of The Maastricht Treaty. "While the European Court of Justice has
jurisdiction to enforce decisions made by the Communities in the first pillar, its
jurisdiction does not extend to decisions involving matters in the second pillar." See
Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal
State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 335, 345 (1994) (construing Maastricht Treaty,
supra note 92, at art. L); see also Kirschner, supra note 10, at 243.
1997-98
24 YEARBOOK OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol.6
(1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental
interests and independence of the Union;
(2) to strengthen the security of the Union and its
Member States in all ways;
(3) to preserve peace and strengthen international
security, in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris
Charter;
(4) to promote international cooperation; and
(5) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.101
Article J.1(4) also declares that "Member States shall support the
Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a
spirit of... solidarity,"' 02 and "shall refrain from any action contrary
to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a
cohesive force in international relations."" 3 Members are thus
required to "actively and unreservedly"10 4 maintain the EU's security
and defense policies, while avoiding participation in any activity
contrary to its interests.
101 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J. 1.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Elliot, supra note 15, at 345.
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Article J.2(l) creates a consultative forum for matters
concerning the common foreign and security policy "to ensure that
[members']combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible
by means of concerted and convergent action."' °5 Next, Article J.2
grants the Council the power to "define a common position,"'0 6 after
which "Member States shall ensure that their national policies
conform to the common positions."'0 7 Lastly, Article J.2 requires
members to "coordinate"'0 8 and "uphold [the EU's] common
positions [in] international organizations and at international
conferences,"'0 9 regardless of whether or not they are participants 10
In accordance with Article J.2's provisions, Article J.3(4) then
provides that "[j]oint actions shall commit the Member States in the
positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.""'
Therefore, if the Council votes unanimously on the necessity of a
joint military action, the decision is binding on member states.'
1 2
105 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.2.
106 Id.; I.A.1-2 EUROPEAN UNION LAW GUIDE: I. TREATIES & BASIC
DOCUMENTs 9 (Philip Raworth ed., 1994) [hereinafter LAW GUIDE]. See
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.8(2) ("The Council shall take the
decisions necessary for defiming and implementing the common foreign and
security policy... It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action
by the Union.").
107 Id.
108 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.2.
109 Id.
110 Id
111 Id at art. J.3(4).
112 See Glaesner, supra note 99, at 780; see also Council Decision of 6 Dec.
1993, art. 17, 1993 O.J. (L 304) 1. The Council is authorized to make all common
foreign and security policy decisions regarding common positions and joint action
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Despite the provisions set out in Title V, an effective security
policy could not be created without any "means for
implementation.""..3 According to Article 30 of the SEA, if the EEC
could achieve "closer cooperation in the field of security,""' 4 either
NATO or the WEU would be chosen to carry out the EU's common
foreign and security policy. Which defensive alliance did the EU
select to implement its second pillar? The EU, in Article J.4(2),
chose the WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of
the Union which have defence implications. '" However, Article J.4,
which considers the WEU to be an "integral part of the Union,""' 6
under Articles J.2(2), J.8(2) and J.3(1). However, these decisions do not have the
proper form to be granted binding legal effect under Article 189 of the Treaty of
Rome, which only gives Community issues binding effect. Decisions formulated
under the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty are treated differently, falling
under Article 17 of the Council's Rules of Procedure of 6 Dec. 1993. Because
these decisions cannot be given binding effect under Article 189, Article J.2
imposes a duty on member states "to ensure that their national policies conform
with the common positions [of the Community.]"
113 Elliot, supra note 15, at 615.
114 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.4(2); see Maxine Mead, Book
Note, 19 MD. J. INT'L & TRADE 325 (1995) (reviewing TED GALEN CARPENTER,
BEYOND NATO: STAYING OUT OF EUROPE'S WARS (1994)) (the EU adopted the
WEU as its "defense component"); see also Elliot, supra note 15, at 615-16.
Another contender for the position had been the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe ("OSCE"). Created by the Helsinki Act, the EU did not choose the OSCE
because of its cumbersome voting system: all fifty-four members, who have an
equal vote (Le., "San Marino and Malta can together outvote France"), must reach
a consensus before any action can be taken.
115 Id.
116 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.4; CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra
note 1, at xxv; see Elliot, supra note 15, at 617 n.84 (On March 7, 1991, while
speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, former
Commission President Jacques Delors said, "If we are to create a European Union,
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does not suggest it is a member of the EU; unless circumstances
change, the WEU will continue to be a "legally independent
international organization.""'  The Maastricht Treaty also avoids
including language naming the WEU as a common military force;
instead, the WEU's role is simply to formulate policy, which must
then be submitted for approval to the Council.III
VII. THE DUAL ROLES OF THE WEU AND NATO IN EUROPEAN
DEFENSE
The decision to select the WEU over NATO involved a
careful compromise between those favoring the established military
strength of the Atlantic alliance and those emphasizing the necessity
of a Europe-only defense organization. Ultimately, the EU selected
the WEU because NATO, whose membership includes both the
United States and Canada, "doesn't... allow Europe exclusively to
make its own decisions.""' 9  In spite of this selection, careful
consideration is granted to NATO in Article J.4(4), which provides:
a lengthy process must be set in motion to allow integration of the WEU... into
the Community." (quoting Europe Documents, No. 1699, at 7 (Mar. 13, 1991)).
117 Id.
118 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.4(1) ("The common foreign
and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union,
including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time
lead to a common defence.") (italics added); cf Stuart E. Eizenstat, US. Relations
with the European Union and the Changing Europe, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 16
(1995) ("The EU could enunciate a [defense] plan, but does not have sufficient
capabilities or military cohesion to effectuate it.").
119 Elliot, supra note 15, at 617; Camey, supra note 50, at 489 (because the
United States is NATO's largest contributor, "[s]upreme [c]ommand of NATO
forces would.., remain with the U.S. military.").
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the policy of the Union in accordance with this Article
shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States
and shall respect the obligations of certain Member
States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be
compatible with the common security and defence
policy established within that framework. (emphasis
added). 20
Article J.4(4) assumes agreement between policy and implementation
decisions made by NATO and the WEU. This means that "the
obligations of Member States under [NATO] will not conflict with
their obligations under the [EU's] common foreign and security
policy.''
In addition to Title V, the common foreign and security policy
consists of two declarations, concurrently signed with and annexed
to the Maastricht Treaty, which further the WEU's responsibilities.
First, in Article 2 of the Declaration of the role of WEU and its
relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance,
2 2
120 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. J.4(4); cf id. at art. J.4(5) (two or
more member states are permitted to pursue closer cooperation within the
framework of the WEU or NATO, if plans are "compatible with the common
security and defense policy established within that framework.").
121 LAw GUIDE, supra note 106, at 9; see The European Security andDefence
Identity: NATO-WEU Cooperation 1 (visited Jan. 11, 1997)
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs3.htm>. The Council of the WEU first formally
met with NATO at NATO Headquarters on May 21, 1992 to discuss the
relationship between both alliances and "ways of strengthening practical
cooperation as well as establishing closer working ties between them." The
Secretary General of the WEU now regularly attends NATO's ministerial meetings,
and NATO's secretary general regularly attends those of the WEU.
122 Declaration on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union
and with the Atlantic Alliance, Dec. 10, 1991, reprinted in CHANGING FUNCTIONs,
supra note 1, at 131 [hereinafter Maastricht Declaration 1].
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the Council approved a two-part vision of the WEU's role within the
EU: the WEU will become the defense unit of the EU; and, as such,
the WEU will be the "European pillar" 123 of NATO. In other words,
the WEU will now be the "defense bridge"'2 4 between the EU and
NATO. To carry out this policy, the WEU will "formulate [a]
common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete
implementation through the further development of its own
operational role."'25 Furthermore, the WEU will be pursuing both its
and NATO's common interests by "introducing joint positions...
into the process of consultation in [NATO] which will remain the
essential forum for consultation among its members."'126 Lastly, the
Declaration of the role gives the WEU authority to "formulate
common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete
implementation through further development of its own operational
role."'27 Because the Declaration of the role's goal is to develop the
123 CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xxiv; Maastricht Declaration 1,
supra note 122, at art 2.
124 LAW GUIDE, supranote 106, at 9; see The European Security andDefence
Identity: NATO's European Pillar 1 (visited Jan. 11, 1997) <http://
www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs3.htm> (NATO has declared that it "stand[s] ready to
make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the
North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in
pursuit of their common Foreign and Security Policy.").
125 Maastricht Declaration 1, supra note 122, at art. 2.
126 Id at art. B.4; see The European Security and Defence Identity: NATO's
European Pillar, supra note 39, at 2 (To further cooperation with the WEU,
NATO has endorsed creating Combined Joint Task Forces ("CJTFs"), whose
function is to "[develop] separable but not separate military capabilities for use by
both [alliances].").
127 Maastricht Declaration 1, supra note 122, at art. 2.
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WEU as the "defence component of the [EU],"'28 its goal is to be
ready, at the Council's request, "to elaborate and implement decisions
and actions of the Union which have defence implications. '"129
Second, the WEU adopted the Declaration on relations
between WEUand the other European States. 30 This Declaration on
relations invites non-member European States to join the WEU,
either as a full member or an observer. NATO members who had not
joined the WEU could also be admitted as associate members. 3'
VIII. FURTHER DECLARATIONS DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE WEU
Since the Maastricht Treaty and Declarations established the
common foreign and security policy, the EU has adopted, among
many, two declarations which specifically enlarge the scope of the
WEU's activities. First, the EU adopted the Petersberg Declaration
128 Id. at art. A.3; see The European Security andDefence Identity: Common
European Defence Policy $ 3 (visited Jan. 11, 1997)
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs3.htm>. At the NATO meeting in Noordwijk,
Netherlands in May of 1995, NATO ministers took note of the initiative of Italy,
Spain and France to create both a land force (EUROFOR) and a naval force
(EUROMARFOR). Membership in these forces is open to all WEU parties, and
the forces would be "answerable to the WEU." These forces could then be
employed within NATO's framework.
129 Id.
130 Declaration on relations between WEU and the other European States,
Dec. 10, 1991, reprinted in CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at 135
[hereinafter Maastricht Declaration 2].
131 See CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xxv; see also WEU Treaty,
supra note 67, at art. XI ("The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite
any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed upon
between them and the State so invited."); see generally EC: Europe Documents:
No. 1781 - WEU Ministerial Council, 19 June in Petersberg (Bonn), Reuter
Textline Agence Europe, June 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library,
TxTec File (EU members invited to join WEU).
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on June 19, 1992 during a meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and Defence in Bonn, Germany.132 The Petersberg
Declaration, in part one, points out that as the WEU "develops its
Maastricht Treaty," it will be able to assist the U.N. and the OSCE in
implementing "conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures,
including peacekeeping activities.' 33 This would require the WEU
to have a stronger operational role. Part two, in Article 4, then
sanctions the use of WEU military units for "humanitarian and rescue
tasks [and] peace-keeping tasks.' 34 The military units will be taken
from "the forces of WEU member states, including forces with
NATO missions," while the "planning and execution of these tasks
will ... ensure the collective defence of the Allies.' 35 In other
words, armed forces from WEU member states will be acting under
the authority of the WEU when performing these tasks. However,
"participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision
of member States in accordance with national constitutions."'
36
132 See generally Germany: WEU Meeting of 19 June Opens Up Concrete
Prospects in Direction of Common Defense Policy, Reuters Textline Agence
Europe, June 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, TxTec File.
133 Petersberg Declaration, June 19, 1992, reprinted in CHANGING
FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at 137.
134 Id. at 142; see Portugal: WEU Council in Lisbon Decides to Strengthen
Operational Capabilities, ReuterTextline Agence Europe, May 16,1995, available
in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, TxTec File ("Eurofor and Euromarfor will be declared
forces available to WEU...").
135 Petersberg Declaration, supra note 133, at 142 (arts. 5 and 6); see British
Presidency of the Western European Union: WEU's Operational Role 4 (visited
Jan. 11, 1997) <http://tlingit.elmail.co.uk2000/weu/briefingnote.html>.
136 Petersberg Declaration, supra note 133, at 142 (arts. 2 and 3); see
Germany: Van Eekelen Welcomes Constitutional Court's Decision on Peace-
Keeping Operations, Reuter Textline Agence Europe, July 15, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Eurcom Library, TxTec File (Petersberg Declaration also states that
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Lastly, the third part of the Petersberg Declaration presents two new
forms of WEU membership: associate membership and observership.
The "rights and duties"'37 of both new forms of membership are
enumerated in the Petersberg Declaration.
Second, the Kirchberg Declaration,138 adopted on May 9,
1994, grew out of the WEU's ministerial meeting on June 19, 1992 in
Bonn, Germany, which included representatives from Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania. The WEU defense ministers and the Eastern European
countries in attendance agreed on certain measures designed to
benefit both sides. The meeting established two levels of
consultation, both called the WEU Forum on Consultation: an annual
meeting between the foreign and defense ministers and a bi-annual
meeting between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors
of the states represented at the meeting. Also, a Counsellors' Group
had been created, convening three to four times yearly to plan for
Forum on Consultation meetings and "to hold detailed exchanges of
views."' 39 By establishing both Forums on Consultation, the WEU
has obtained closer ties with the former communist countries without
necessarily providing them with full membership opportunities.'40
participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of WEU
Member States in accordance with their national constitutions).
137 See Petersberg Declaration, supra note 133, at 144-46 (art. B).
138 Kirchberg Declaration, May 9, 1994, reprinted in CHANGING FUNCTIONS,
supra note 1, at 191.
139 CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xxvii (the WEU Forum on
Consultation can be thought of as the counterpart of NATO's Partnership for
Peace).
140 See Kirchberg Declaration, supra note 138, at 199 (status as an associate
partner does not entail any changes to the WEU Treaty).
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The Kirchberg Declaration, named after the Kirchberg
Building in Luxembourg, introduced associate partnerships, a new
form of membership specifically created for the former communist
countries. Associate partners "do not have the rights and duties based
on Article V of the Brussels [Pact] and cannot veto any Council
decision, but some influence on the decision-making process is to be
expected.'' i. 1 However, associate partners may affiliate themselves
with decisions made by member states concerning missions such as
"humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat
forces in crisis management including peacekeeping."'' 42 When the
WEU decides that an associate partner "[joins] such WEU operation
by committing forces, [it] will have the same obligations as other
participants, as well as the right of involvement in the command
structures and in the Council's subsequent decision-making
process."' 43 Nevertheless, associate partners are required to attend
and participate in bi-weekly meetings of the Council, but they are
proscribed from "block[ing] a decision that is the subject of
consensus among the member states." 44 In response to the WEU's
invitation, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,




142 Id. at 199-200 (art. 2); see Luxembourg: Status of "Associate Partner"
Does Not Compete with NATO's PFP-WEU Council President, Reuter Textline
Agence Europe, May 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, TxTec File
(associate partners' role in peacekeeping missions would not interfere withNATO's
Partnership for Peace missions).
143 Kirchberg Declaration, supra note 138, at 200 (art. 2).
144 Id. at 199 (art. 1).
145 See id. at 199; see also Eastern Europe: Kirchberg Declaration 9 May
1994, ReuterTextline SCAD, Sept. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library,
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IX. THE WEU'S INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN
EUROPE
After taking charge of the EU's common foreign and security
policy, the WEU began its new role by declaring its "willingness to
help ensure effective implementation of [U.N.] Security Council
resolutions relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.""' On
July 10, 1992, in cooperation with and under the supervision of
NATO, the WEU began sending naval forces to the Adriatic Sea to
monitor an embargo against Montenegro and Serbia. By June 8,
1993, NATO and the WEU established ajoint naval operation in the
Adriatic Sea called Operation Sharp Guard, to enforce compliance
with U.N. Security Council sanctions raised against Montenegro and
Serbia.47 The WEU is involved in two other operations in the former
Yugoslavia, which also help enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions.
First, in "Operation Danube," under the auspices of the OSCE, the
WEU provides logistical support by enforcing an embargo against the
former Yugoslavia.' For this operation, the WEU has been able to
maintain close cooperation with the riparian states of Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary, who are its associate partners, "through the
TxTec File (nine Eastern European countries become associate partners of the
WEU: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
& Czech Republic); Quarterly Report: Magreb No. 19 (Part 4 of 5), 1995 Janet
Matthews Information Servs.-Quest Economics Database, MEED Quarterly
Report-Magreb, Sept. 1995, LEXIS, Eurcom Library, TxTec File (because of the
success of the Kirchberg Declaration, the WEU would like to develop and expand
its dialogue on security issues to Egypt and other non-WEU member
Mediterranean states).
146 CHANGING FUNCTIONS, supra note 1, at xxviii.
147 British Presidency, supra note 135, at 5.
148 The WEU and the Yugoslav Conflict (visited Dec. 22, 1996)
<http://www.nato.int/ifor/weu/weuphoto.htm>.
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organization of a police and customs operation."' 49  Second, the
WEU has been helping the EU administer the town of Mostar by
creating a Unified Police Force, "manned jointly by Croats and
Muslims ofBosnia-Herzegovian and police officers sent out by WEU
countries."' 5
X. CONCLUSION
What is the EU's future agenda for the WEU? According to
a 1996 European Parliament resolution discussing relations between
the EU, WEU and NATO, the next step "is to pave the way for full
integration of the WEU into the EU after the expiry of the WEU
Treaty."' 5' Merging the WEU into the EU implies the end of an
independent WEU, with the EU taking over control of all collective
defense matters and tasks. Nonetheless, numerous obstacles will
need to be eliminated before integration will be feasible. Integration
problems will probably arise from those EU members, such as Ireland
and Denmark, who, as WEU observers, may need to become full
members. Integration problems may also surface from the fact that
states now acceding to the EU must accept the Maastricht Treaty's
common foreign and security policy provisions. In other words, the
concept of acquis communautaire,'5 2 which means that "states
149 Id. (Operation Danube's Coordination and Support Center is located in
Calafat, Romania. A total of 300 police and customs officers and I 1 boats actively
patrol the Danube).
150 Id.
151 CHANGING FUNCTIONs, supra note 1, at xxix.
152 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 92, at art. B (One ofthe EU's objectives
is "to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to
considering.., to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by
this Treaty need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the
mechanisms and the institutions of the Community."); see also id. at art. C ("The
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acceding to the EU accede to the entire Union, including all laws and
provisions of the Union, and are not free to pick and choose which
aspects they wish to adhere to and which they wish to ignore," ' 3 now
extends to all three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty. Most
importantly, the WEU will need to become a fully operational
military alliance as quickly as possible to attain its goal of providing
a common foreign and security policy for the EU.'54
Since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent
collapse of communism in both the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European allies, the threat of a communist invasion, NATO's raison
d'etre, no longer exists. Is NATO still a viable alliance now that
Europe is no longer threatened by its principal adversary, the Soviet
Union? Despite the fact that the Cold War has ended, it is reasonable
to keep in place a strong multinational security alliance which is
equipped to respond to future security challenges. NATO's
Union shall be served by a single constitutional framework which shall ensure the
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire."); id. at
art. 0 (Article 0 has been interpreted as extending acquis communautaire to the
EU as a whole).
153 Elliot, supra note 15, at 604; see id. at 619 (In the Commission's 1992
report, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, it expressly expanded the
definition of acquis communautaire to include "the contents, principles and
political objectives of the ... Maastricht Treaty."); see also id. at 620 (Former
Commission President Jacques Delors said, "new members will have to accept the
acquis communautaire... the whole Union Treaty and nothing but the Union
Treaty.").
154 See The WEU and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy
12 (visited January 11 , 1997)
<http://sunsite.sut.ac.jp/arch/academic/history/marshall/military/a-weu/051093>.
While speaking at the Institut Royal Superieur de Defense in Brussels, Belgium on
Oct. 5, 1993, Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly said, "I believe
that we are still some way from fully implementing a common European foreign
and security policy, let alone the 'eventual framing' of a common European
defence policy with all that that implies."
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consultative machinery, provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty,
fosters cooperation among member states, creating a necessary forum
for solving international security issues as they arise.155 In fact, the
United States has been the most adamant voice among member states
for not only keeping NATO alive, but also for expanding its
membership to include the former Soviet Union's Eastern European
allies. The United States' interest in retaining the NATO alliance is
to keep its European allies and preserve its power and influence over
Europe, whereas the Eastern Europeans view NATO membership as
beneficial in two ways: first, "they fear that Russia may attempt to
regain its lost territory and status, and desire the military security
NATO could provide;" and second, "NATO membership is a
probable 'in' to later inclusion in the West European economic
system."'156 The language of Article 10 of the Treaty, which refers to
any European state, does not by its terms limit membership only to
Western Europe. Therefore, according to Article 10, if an Eastern
European state wishes to join NATO, it must simply be able to
further the Treaty's principles, and contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic region.
157
155 See generally Geoffrey Smith, Global Paradigms: The Impact ofCultures
on Trade and Diplomacy: The Political and Security Dimensions: The Classical
Paradigm Revisited: "Trans-Atlantic Relations in Turmoil: NATO and the Future
of Europe, " 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 115 (1995).
156 Mead, supra note 114, at 325.
157 NATO Treaty, supra note 38, at art. 10 (a European state must fulfill both
factors to be considered for NATO membership).
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